An Introduction to Modal Logic II

Syntax and Semantics

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Modal Logic

Syntax



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Language and formulas

Language

- A countable set of propositional variables $Prop = \{p, q, \ldots\}$,
- \bullet the classical propositional constants \top and $\bot,$
- \bullet the classical propositional connectives $\wedge,\,\vee,\,\rightarrow$ and $\neg,$
- two unary modal connectives \Box and \diamondsuit .

Formulas

The set Φ of modal formulas is inductively built from *Prop* in the following way:

- Propositional variables and constants are formulas,
- if φ and ψ are formulas, then $\varphi \wedge \psi$, $\varphi \vee \psi$, $\varphi \to \psi$ and $\neg \varphi$ are formulas,
- if φ is a formula, then □φ and ◊φ are formulas.



Normal Modal Logics

Definition

A normal modal logic Λ is a set of formulas containing:

- all classical tautologies (in the modal language),
- $\Box(p
 ightarrow q)
 ightarrow (\Box p
 ightarrow \Box q)$ (axiom (K)),
- $\Box \ p \leftrightarrow \neg \Diamond \neg p$,
- $\Diamond p \leftrightarrow \neg \Box \neg p$,

and is closed under:

(MP) Modus Ponens: if $\varphi \in \Lambda$ and $\varphi \rightarrow \psi \in \Lambda$, then $\psi \in \Lambda$, (US) Uniform Substitution: if $\varphi \in \Lambda$, then $\psi \in \Lambda$, where ψ is

- obtained from φ by replacing propositional variables by arbitrary formulas,
- (G) Generalization: if $\varphi \in \Lambda$, then $\Box \varphi \in \Lambda$.

Remarks

- in this way a modal logic is defined as **set of theorems**, rather than as a deducibility operator;
- the **set-like definition** can be equivalently replaced by an Hilbert-style axiomatic system based on the notion of deducibility;
- in this sense every modal logic is the **expansion of CPL** by means of two (or more) modal connectives;
- there exists a **minimal normal modal logic** and it is denoted by K (after S. Kripke);
- note that Lewis' S1 system is not a normal modal logic;
- we are indeed defining what a **uni-modal logic** is, but this framework can be extended to any countable set of modalities;
- nevertheless, normal modal logics are defined semantically.



Axiomatic Extensions: axioms

(4) $\Box p \rightarrow \Box \Box p$ (T) $\Box p
ightarrow p$ (B) $p \rightarrow \Box \Diamond p$ (D) $\Box p \rightarrow \Diamond p$ (E) $\Diamond p \rightarrow \Box \Diamond p$ (M) $\Box \Diamond p \rightarrow \Diamond \Box p$ (G) $\Diamond \Box p \rightarrow \Box \Diamond p$ (L) $\Box(\Box p \rightarrow p) \rightarrow \Box p$



Axiomatic Extensions: logics

- $T \longrightarrow KT$
- $K4 \longrightarrow K4$
- $S4 \longrightarrow KT4$
- $B \longrightarrow KTB$
- $S5 \quad \rightsquigarrow \quad KT4B \text{ or } KT4E$
- $GL \longrightarrow KL$
- $D \longrightarrow KD$
- $D4 \longrightarrow KD4$



Semantics




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Kripke frames

A Kripke frame is a structure $\mathfrak{F} = \langle W, R \rangle$, where:

- W is a non-empty set of elements, often called **possible worlds**,
- *R* ⊆ *W* × *W* is a binary relation on *W*, called the accessibility relation of *W*.



Kripke models

A **Kripke model** is a structure $\mathfrak{M} = \langle W, R, V \rangle$, where:

- $\langle W, R \rangle$ is a Kripke frame,
- $V: \operatorname{Prop} \times W \longrightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is a function that assigns a boolean value to every ordered pair of propositional variables and possible worlds.

The evaluation relation can be also viewed in the two following equivalent ways:

- as a function V: W → P(Prop) such that, given a world w ∈ W returns the set V(w) of propositional variables true in w;
- as a function V: Prop → P(W) such that, given a propositional variable p ∈ Prop returns the set V(p) of worlds where p is true.

Evaluation of formulas

Given a Kripke model $\mathfrak{M} = \langle W, R, V \rangle$ and a world $w \in W$, the evaluation V of propositional variables can be inductively extended to arbitrary formulas in the following way:

•
$$V(\top, w) = 1$$
,

•
$$V(\perp,w)=0$$
,

•
$$V(\varphi \wedge \psi, w) = \min\{V(\varphi, w), V(\psi, w)\},\$$

•
$$V(\varphi \lor \psi, w) = \max\{V(\varphi, w), V(\psi, w)\},\$$

•
$$V(\varphi \rightarrow \psi, w) = \max\{1 - V(\varphi, w), V(\psi, w)\},\$$

•
$$V(\neg \varphi, w) = 1 - V(\varphi, w)$$

•
$$V(\Box \varphi, w) = (\forall v)(R(w, v) \Rightarrow V(\varphi, v)),$$

•
$$V(\diamond \varphi, w) = (\exists v)(R(w, v) \land V(\varphi, v)).$$

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
Semantics of the necessity operator $\ \square$

The expression

$$V(\Box\varphi,w) = (\forall v)(R(w,v) \Rightarrow V(\varphi,v))$$

is equivalent to the condition:

formula $\Box \varphi$ is true in world w iff φ is true in every world v accessible from w iff for every world $w \in W$, if R(w, v), then $V(\varphi, v) = 1$;




Semantics of the possibility operator \diamond

The expression

$$V(\Diamond \varphi, w) = (\exists v)(R(w, v) \land V(\varphi, v))$$

is equivalent to the condition:

formula $\Diamond \varphi$ is true in world w iff there exists a world v accessible from w and φ is true in v iff there exists a world v such that R(w, v) and $V(\varphi, v) = 1$;



Example: the theorem $\Diamond \varphi \leftrightarrow \neg \Box \neg \varphi$ (I)

Let $\mathfrak{M} = \langle W, R, V \rangle$ be a model and $w \in W$, then:

- formula $\Diamond \varphi$ is true in w iff
- there exists $v \in W$ such that both R(w, v) and φ is true in v, iff
- it is not true that, in every v ∈ W such that R(w, v), formula φ is false, iff
- it is not true that, in every $v \in W$ such that R(w, v), formula $\neg \varphi$ is true, iff
- it is not true that formula $\Box\neg\varphi$ is true in w, iff
- formula $\Box \neg \varphi$ is false in w, iff
- formula $\neg \Box \neg \varphi$ is true in *w*.

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Example: the theorem $\Diamond \varphi \leftrightarrow \neg \Box \neg \varphi$ (II)

Let $\mathfrak{M} = \langle W, R, V \rangle$ be a model and $w \in W$, then:

$$V(\Diamond \varphi, w) =$$

$$= (\exists v)(R(w, v) \land V(\varphi, v)) =$$

$$= \neg \neg (\exists v)(R(w, v) \land V(\varphi, v)) =$$

$$= \neg (\forall v)(\neg (R(w, v) \land V(\varphi, v))) =$$

$$= \neg (\forall v)(R(w, v) \Rightarrow \neg V(\varphi, w)) =$$

$$= \neg V(\Box \neg \varphi, w) =$$

$$= V(\neg \Box \neg \varphi, w)$$

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Satisfaction of a formula

Let $\mathfrak{M} = \langle W, R, V angle$	be a n	nodel and $w\in W$, then:
$\mathfrak{M}, w \vDash p$	iff	V(ho,w)=1
$\mathfrak{M}, w \vDash o$		always
$\mathfrak{M},$ w $Dash \perp$		never
$\mathfrak{M}, w \vDash \neg \varphi$	iff	$\mathfrak{M}, w \nvDash \varphi$
$\mathfrak{M}, \mathbf{w} \vDash \varphi \wedge \psi$	iff	both $\mathfrak{M}, w \vDash \varphi$ and $\mathfrak{M}, w \vDash \psi$
$\mathfrak{M}, \mathbf{w} \vDash \varphi \lor \psi$	iff	either $\mathfrak{M}, w \vDash \varphi$ or $\mathfrak{M}, w \vDash \psi$
$\mathfrak{M}, w \vDash \Box \varphi$	iff	for every $v \in W$ s.t. $R(w, v)$,
		it holds that $\mathfrak{M}, \mathbf{v} \vDash arphi$
$\mathfrak{M}, \mathbf{w} \vDash \Diamond \varphi$	iff	there exists $v \in W$ s.t. $R(w, v)$
		and $\mathfrak{M}, v \models \varphi$

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Local and Global Satisfiability

We say that a formula φ is locally satisfiable, if there exists a model M = ⟨W, R, V⟩ and w ∈ W, such that

 $\mathfrak{M}, \mathbf{w} \vDash \varphi$

 We say that a formula φ is globally satisfiable, in a model *M* = ⟨W, R, V⟩, if φ is (locally) satisfiable in every point *w* ∈ W. In symbols:

 $\mathfrak{M}\vDash\varphi$


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Remark

Both notions of local and global satisfiability **do not coincide**. Consider \mathfrak{M} :

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Then

- $\mathfrak{M}, b \vDash \Box p$ and
- $\mathfrak{M}, c \vDash \Box p$, but
- $\mathfrak{M}, a \nvDash \Box p$, hence
- $\mathfrak{M} \nvDash \Box p$



Modal Logic I

Validity

We say that a formula φ is valid in a frame 𝔅 = ⟨W, R⟩, if for every model 𝔐 = ⟨W, R, V⟩ and every w ∈ W, it holds that 𝔐, w ⊨ φ. In symbols

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$$\mathfrak{F}\vDash \varphi$$

We say that a formula φ is valid in a class of frames F if it is valid in every frame 𝔅 ∈ F. In symbols:

$$\mathbf{F}\vDash\varphi$$

We say that a formula φ is valid, if it is valid in every class of frames F. In symbols:

 $\models \varphi$

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Semantic Consequence relations

Let $\Gamma\cup\varphi$ be a set of modal formulas and ${\bf M}$ a class of models, then:

We say that a formula φ is a local consequence of Γ over M, if for all models M = ⟨W, R, V⟩ ∈ M and all points w ∈ W, it holds that

• if
$$\mathfrak{M}, w \vDash \Gamma$$
, then $\mathfrak{M}, w \vDash \varphi$.

In symbols:
$$\Gamma \vDash^{l}_{\mathbf{M}} \varphi$$
.

We say that a formula φ is a global consequence of Γ over M, if for all models M = ⟨W, R, V⟩ ∈ M it holds that


• if
$$\mathfrak{M} \vDash \Gamma$$
, then $\mathfrak{M} \vDash \varphi$.

In symbols: $\Gamma \vDash^{g}_{M} \varphi$.

Remark

Both notions of local and global consequence **do not coincide**. Consider \mathfrak{M} :

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Then

- since $\mathfrak{M}, a \vDash p$, but $\mathfrak{M}, a \nvDash \Box p$, then $\{p\} \nvDash'_{\{\mathfrak{M}\}} \Box p$;
- since $\mathfrak{M} \nvDash p$, then $\{p\} \vDash_{\{\mathfrak{M}\}}^{g} \Box p$;
- So, □p is a global consequence, but not a local consequence of p.

